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Standardization is typically cast in technocratic language. Beneath the technical 
veneer, however, there is politics.1 While the development of standards brings 
about opportunities for innovation and market access for some firms, for others it 
entails significant switching costs. Product specifications may need to be changed, 
production processes and methods may require amendment or the manufacture 
of certain products might need to be abandoned completely. With so much at 
stake, there are strong incentives to influence standards development. 
 
Political contestation around standardization may lead standards development 
organizations (SDOs) to adopt suboptimal standards: they may fail to take into 
account state-of-the-art research, underestimate certain risks, or worse, favor 
certain industry interests over safety concerns of potential end-users. Incomplete, 
inaccurate or plainly “bad” standards can cause harm to firms implementing them 
in business operations, as well as to consumers using products designed in 
compliance with them. Inevitably, then, the question of tort liability for standards 
development arises. 
 
This chapter addresses three interrelated questions concerning tort liability for 
private standards development. First, what theories of tort law govern civil 
liability for such an activity? Second, what factors and circumstances do courts 
consider significant when assessing liability for harm caused by inadequate 
standards? Third and finally, what is the exposure of SDOs to liability given the 
answers to the first two questions? In answering these questions, this chapter 
builds on case law and academic literature from the United States (US) and 
European Union (EU). Case law in these multi-layered jurisdictions is most 
developed, best documented and electronically searchable and accessible. Data 
was retrieved by systematic searches using case law databases and secondary 
sources, such as academic literature, government reports, and industry policy 
briefs. 
 
This chapter will first draw attention to a number of general aspects of private 
standards development that scholars of regulation and governance have 
considered important attributes of standardization and that may impact on the 
liability of SDOs.2 This discussion serves to further embed the research questions 
in the literature on standardization and civil liability, thus providing more focus 
to the research questions. In discussing these general aspects, product standards 
will be the point of reference. These standards set out technical specifications for 
the design, production and performance characteristics of manufactured goods. 
They may prescribe physical attributes for products (including dimensions, size 
and composition), require certain methods of production, construction and 
assembly, or concern requirements of what a product must be able to do.3 
                                                        
1 Büthe and Mattli 2011, p, 12. 
2 The tort liability of individual participants involved in standards development, as discussed in e.g. Bay 
Summit Community Ass’n (1996), is beyond the scope of this contribution. The focus is on the liability of the 
SDO as the actor that promulgated the allegedly inadequate private standards. 
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Examples of such performance characteristics concern interoperability with other 
products, resistance to temperature exposure, the level of user safety, testing 
methods, and quality assurance. Along the category of product standards, 
standards for services and system management have come to play an important 
role in our contemporary ‘world of standards’.4 So far, however, very little case 
law has developed with respect to these complementary types of standards. Most 
of the civil litigation against SDOs to date concerns product standards. The 
maturity of this body of case law allows for a rich and coherent analysis and 
therefore this chapter is concerned primarily with product standards. 
 
2. General Aspects of Tort Liability for Standards Development 
 
Standards development is celebrated for providing a wide range of important 
benefits to individuals, firms, and society at large. Sometimes, however, it may 
harm the interests of individuals and firms. Firms that suffer economic loss either 
because standards limit competition, restrict market access or violate pre-existing 
intellectual property (IP) rights, will principally have to look to antitrust, trade or 
IP law for protection.5 Tort law may instead provide a remedy to firms who suffer 
economic loss because they relied on incomplete, outdated or otherwise 
inadequate standards in their business operations, or to those who suffer physical 
harm (i.e. personal injury or property damage) because they used a product that 
was manufactured in conformity with such bad standards. 
 
As a general rule in the US and EU, tort law exposes an SDO to civil liability when 
it fails to exercise reasonable care in its activities and that failure causes direct or 
foreseeable physical harm to another. Standards development does not ordinarily 
cause direct or foreseeable harm to others, however. Harm occurs primarily after 
inadequate standards are relied upon in the business operations of the addressees 
of these standards, typically manufacturers or sellers, who design or construct, 
install and maintain products in accordance with the standards. If standards turn 
out to be inadequate, these actors, by complying with the standards, place on the 
market a defective product. Accordingly, they may be held primarily responsible 
under the strict liability rules of products liability law.6  
 
However, there are valid reasons to bring a civil liability claim against the SDO as 
a tortfeasor secondary to manufacturers or sellers. These may include the moral 
consideration that the SDO’s standards are the origin of the harm given that 
manufacturers or sellers routinely implement these standards in their business 
operations. More practical considerations to target the SDO involved include the 
insolvency of the manufacturer, the ability of the manufacturer to escape liability 
                                                        
4 Brunsson and Jacobsson 2001. See for a recent perspective on the rise of system management standards 
Galland 2017 (discussing how the global certification industry is further pushing the adoption of these 
standards by SDOs and governments). 
5 These actions are discussed extensively elsewhere in this volume and in Volume I. 
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under the so-called ‘regulatory compliance defense’,7 or the potentially ‘deeper 
pocket’ of the SDO (e.g. because of its comprehensive insurance coverage). If a 
liability claim is to prevail, however, the plaintiff must show that the conduct of 
the defendant SDO created a risk of direct or foreseeable harm. Thus, a key 
question for the inquiry in the chapter is: What factors do courts consider relevant 
in constructing foreseeability of harm and a sufficiently close relationship 
between the SDO’s activities and the plaintiff’s harm? Such factors are likely to be 
addressed in relation to the existence of a duty of care in negligence and the breach 
of that duty (or any other equivalent concepts of national tort law). They may also 
be found in considerations around causation, however, by asking: Did the 
inadequate standards proximately cause the harm suffered by the plaintiff, 
without any significant interference by the standards’ addressee? Viewed in this 
way, a plaintiff may establish liability by following the chain of causation all the 
way up to the negligent adoption of the inadequate standards.  
 
This discussion on the relationship between standards development and the 
plaintiff’s harm draws attention to the degree to which the contested standards 
are binding upon manufacturers. Within that context, a distinction is typically 
made between ‘technical regulations’ and ‘voluntary standards’. The first 
category, following the parlance of international economic law, involve standards 
that are adopted by public, state actors and that are mandated by law.8 This 
chapter is only concerned with voluntary standards, which are standards 
developed by private, non-state actors. They are non-mandatory in that actors can 
choose to abide by them. This voluntariness can be compromised in various ways, 
of course.9 Private standards can be de facto mandatory if they constitute a 
condition for market access or the ability to effectively compete on it. Moreover, 
SDO internal regulations (e.g. bylaws, company statutes and rules of association) 
may impose compliance with private standards on membership and may employ 
mechanisms of certification and accreditation to enforce that obligation.10 In 
addition, supply chain partners may require compliance with standards via 
commercial contracts or procurement policies.11 In the public law domain, 
legislative measures, public authorities and courts may encourage or demand 
compliance with such standards once they have been adopted by a particular SDO, 
thus mandating them de facto or de jure.12 Clearly, such public intervention blurs 
                                                        
7 Manufacturers and sellers in the US and EU may be able to escape liability under this defense if compliance 
with the inadequate standards was mandated by public statute. See on this defense and its relation to 
private standards Schepel 2005, 361-374. 
8 WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Annex 1: Terms and their Definitions for the 
Purpose of this Agreement, Articles 1 and 2. See also Article 1(f) Directive 2015/1535/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of 
information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services [2015] OJ 
L241/1. This definition does not exclude the possibility that private actors (including SDOs) participate in 
the development of a technical regulation. As noted, however, the liability of individual participants in 
standards development is beyond the scope of this contribution (see at footnote 2). 
9 See in detail Cafaggi 2012, 22. 
10 E.g. the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) requires its members to comply with its ANSI 
Essential Requirements (2018) as a condition to have their standards accredited as American National 
Standards. 
11 Verbruggen 2017a, 312 (with further references). 
12 The inclusion and reliance on private and technical standardization in statute is increasingly popular 




Tilburg Institute for Private Law. This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Social 
Science Research Network http://www.ssrn.com/link/Tilburg-Private-Law.html 
 
the lines between public mandatory ‘technical regulations’ and private, voluntary 
standards. This chapter takes the resulting hybridity into account by asking: To 
what extent does (the degree of) public recognition of privately developed 
standards affect the liability risk of SDOs? What difference exists, if any, if 
compared to liability for developing purely private standards? 
 
A related issue concerns the legal form and institutional embedding of SDOs. Most 
SDOs are private, not-for-profit bodies. They may be organized as individual 
companies, but more frequently they are collective, membership-based 
organizations for business, civil society or combinations of these.13 Sometimes, 
however, SDOs are established by public statute or have acquired a public law 
status because of a delegation of public law powers to them.14 Alternatively, SDOs 
may be recognized to have a 'public law function' through the exercise of its 
regulatory activities.15 Acting as bodies governed by public law the question arises 
whether the rules of state liability apply to SDOs setting voluntary product 
standards and whether they can avail themselves of state immunity doctrines to 
escape liability. Heidt (2010, 1280-1284) has argued that, because of the 
governmental nature of SDO decision-making, courts should shield SDOs from 
overly burdensome liability by recognizing a qualified privilege. Such a privilege 
would protect SDOs from civil liability where there decisions are taken in good 
faith, but would simultaneously guard against abusive standards development 
should they act in bad faith.16 
 
Heidt’s suggestion should be read against the background of the inherently 
political nature of standards development. Setting standards implies the making 
of policy-bound trade-offs between the conflicting interests of the owners, users 
and potential beneficiaries of the standards. Concerns of health and safety need to 
be balanced against concerns of cost, inconvenience and consumer choice.17 How 
is this balancing reflected in cases concerning liability for standards development? 
Do courts show (high) levels of deference when evaluating these policy choices, as 
they typically do in judicial review procedures concerning public policy and 
decision-making? More generally, to what extent is the way in which contentious 
standards were designed or governed part of the liability assessment?  
 
What is more, SDOs fulfill an important societal function when they promulgate 
standards that intend to enhance the collective welfare in assistance or in the 
absence of government. Imposing liability on SDOs, it is argued, challenges this 
laudable function and may inhibit the deliberation of possible standards.18 It has 
therefore been suggested that courts, in making the threshold determination 
whether a private association should be exposed to civil liability for standards 
                                                        
13 Abbott and Snidal (2009) have shown that transnational standard setting increasingly involves business 
and civil society actors, thus moving from a state-driven toward a multi-actor approach. See for an overview 
of the international “ecosystem” in ICT-standardization Vol. I, Chapter 2 (Biddle). 
14 See for an overview of technical standardization bodies in Europe Schepel and Falke 2000, 62-68. 
15 This is the case for the national SDO for technical standardization in France called AFNOR. See in detail at 
footnote 107 below. 
16 Heidt 2010, 1280-1284. 
17 Id., 1227-1232. 
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development or other activities, must weigh conflicting considerations of policy 
and justice, including ‘any existing social interest in permitting the type of conduct 
of which the plaintiff complains, the burden which would be imposed on [private 
associations] by judicial intervention in similar cases in the future, the burden on 
courts were they to take cognizance of such disputes, and the extent to which such 
intervention might interfere with other socially recognized values promoted by 
such associations.’19 
 
Finally, SDOs may not only be engaged in the setting of standards. At times they 
also pursue certification and/or accreditation activities. In the case of product 
standards, both activities in essence involve the assessment of a firm’s compliance 
with a normative document, i.e. the product standard. If the assessment is positive 
the firm is typically awarded some form of endorsement, such as an approval, 
enlisting, certificate or accreditation of the product or of the firm itself.20 These 
endorsements do not reveal the specific details of performance, yet offer an 
aggregate, discrete judgment on compliance.21 The attestations therefore 
generally signal packaged information on compliance to specific audiences (either 
businesses, consumers or governments), which may come to rely on it in making 
decisions. Certification and accreditation activities clearly go beyond standards 
development per se. The question arises of whether these activities make SDOs 
more or less vulnerable to liability claims. A discussion of the liability of ‘pure’ 
certification and accreditation activities, i.e. without any standards being 
developed by the certifier or accreditor, is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
3. Perspectives from the US 
 
Individuals and firms in the US have sought compensation for harm from SDOs 
based on several theories of tort law. Actions other than those alleging negligence 
have been unsuccessful for the most part.22 Three actions grounded in negligence 
will be discussed here: negligence; an action based on the so-called ‘voluntary 
undertaking’ rule; and an action for negligent misrepresentation. In each of these 
actions considerations around the existence of a duty of care owed by the 
defendant SDO to the plaintiff are central to the success (or defeat) of the claim. 
 
 
                                                        
19 Editorial Note Harvard Law Review 1963, 990.   . 
20 For a more detailed discussion of certification, see Chapters x and x in this volume. 
21 Bartley 2011, 443. 
22 An exception is the case of Hall and Chance (1972). In this case, which developed out of a series of 
separate incidents across the US in which infants were injured by exploding blasting caps, a US District 
Court in New York held that the industry trade association, which administered a safety program covering 
the use of warning labels for explosives, and the entire national blasting cap industry could be held jointly 
liable under a strict theory of ‘enterprise liability’. Hall and Chance has not been followed by other courts: 
the theory of ‘enterprise liability’ has been abandoned in products liability law and SDOs have not been 
considered subject to strict products liability law as they do not normally engage in selling, distributing or 
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A. Negligence Actions in General 
The elements of a negligence action in American common law are a duty owed by 
the defendant to the plaintiff, breach of that duty by the defendant, and damages 
proximately caused by that breach. In a negligence action a duty may be defined 
as an obligation, recognized and enforceable by law, to conform to a certain 
standard of behavior to another.23 American common law normally imposes a 
duty on an actor when he directly or foreseeably creates a risk of physical harm 
for another, that is, personal injury and property damage.24 When a duty is owed, 
the standard of care to be applied by the court is usually that of reasonable care 
under the circumstances. In general terms, then, SDOs are subject to civil liability 
in an action of negligence for any failure to exercise reasonable care in their 
activities when such failure causes direct or foreseeable physical harm to another. 
 
The element of duty is a threshold issue. If an SDO cannot be found to owe a duty 
to use reasonable care, it is not answerable under common law for any of the harm 
sustained by the plaintiff. The claim will thus be denied. Whether an SDO owes a 
duty to the plaintiff, and what standard of care is required from it, are questions 
of law. These questions are determined by the judge, not the jury.25 An SDO may 
as a preliminary matter petition the judge, via a motion to dismiss or, after 
discovery, in a motion for summary judgment, to hold that it owes no duty to the 
plaintiff. If either motion is granted, the action is rejected before questions on 
breach or proximate cause as addressed by a jury in trial. If, however, a motion is 
denied and the judge considers that a duty is owed, liability does not automatically 
follow: also the other elements of a negligence action have to be established. The 
judge thus only exposes the SDO to potential civil liability for harm. There is a good 
chance that a final decision on liability may not follow in the end, as a duty decision 
can lead the defendant to settle the case before trial. 
B. A Duty of Care in Negligence for SDOs? 
To assess whether an SDO owes a duty of reasonable care in negligence courts 
frequently balance competing considerations of policy and justice that determine 
the fairness of exposing it to civil liability for harm allegedly caused by its 
standards development. These considerations include the foreseeability of harm 
to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s harm, the moral 
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the potential impact of imposing 
liability on preventing such harm in the future, the burden of liability on the 
defendant and the community, the availability and cost of insurance to cover the 
risk of liability involved, and the potential volume of litigation that liability would 
                                                        
23 Cf. Keeton et al. 1984, § 53, at 356. 
24 Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, § 10.1, at 204 (with further references to case law and literature). See 
also Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 7 (2010).  
25 The jury determines questions on fact, unless no reasonable person can differ as to the correct answer. 
These questions concern, most prominently, whether the duty is breached and whether that breach 
proximate caused the harm. American common law thus typically assigns to the jury the determination of 
the other constitutive elements of a negligence claim. See also Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability for 
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generate and its impact on the court system.26 The weight of these factors may 
either be in favor or against imposing a duty. 
 
The majority of the cases involving the liability of SDOs for standards development 
have been rejected through motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. 
Key in such ‘no-duty decisions’ are considerations of policy and justice, together 
with due regard to the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant SDO. In 
Beasock v. Dioguardi Enterprises Inc., for example, the Supreme Court of Monroe 
Country, New York allowed the motion for summary judgment of the Tire and Rim 
Association (TRA) in a wrongful death action. An employee of one of TRA’s 
members, a tire manufacturer, was fatally injured while inflating a truck tire that 
was mistakenly mounted on a bigger size rim. The plaintiff, the wife of the 
deceased employee, claimed that TRA was liable in negligence because it set 
dimensional standards which permitted mismatch injuries to occur. Leaving aside 
the factual question of whether TRA’s standards were indeed inadequate, the 
Supreme Court considered that liability of associations such as TRA, which do not 
directly cause injury to others by the promulgation of their standards, is 
dependent on their authority to control compliance with their standards amongst 
the membership. As the court held in this case, even though TRA standards had 
become industry standards, they were voluntary in nature and the defendant 
lacked the control over any culpable and fatal mismatch in the production process 
since it ‘neither mandates nor monitors the use of its standards by any 
manufacturer’.27 
 
This ‘control thesis’ has emerged as a centerpiece in the judicial reasoning around 
the existence of an SDO’s duty of care in negligence actions. Unless the SDO is in a 
position of authority to direct or control the implementation of the standards by 
the addressees, the harm of the plaintiff was not reasonably foreseeable for the 
defendant SDO and there is no sufficiently close relationship between the latter’s 
conduct and the plaintiff’s harm. In those situations, no duty of care is ordinarily 
owed in negligence to third parties suffering physical harm allegedly caused by 
inadequate standards.28 Several courts have relied upon the thesis to give no-duty 
decisions in actions alleging negligent standards development.29  
 
However, in one specific line of cases courts have used the control thesis as a 
principal argument to impose a duty of care on an SDO. These cases all concerned 
                                                        
26 Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, § 10.3, 208-209.  
27 Beasock (1985), 979. 
28 Cf. Keeton et al. 1984, § 56, at 385 (‘[i]n the absence of the [relationship of control], there is generally no 
duty to protect others against harm from third persons’.) This discussion relates to the distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance, on which see Section B.3 below. 
29 See Bailey v. Hines (1999) (a non-profit trade association that developed standards for the design and 
construction of wood trusses used for roof framing systems owed no duty to severely injured construction 
workers who relied on the its standards to install such systems since the association exercised no control 
over the manufacturer of the product, intended the standards as a guide, and could not require the 
manufacturer to follow its installation instructions; Howard v. Poseidon Pools (1986) (non-profit swimming 
pool trade association owed no duty to a swimmer who sustained diving injury for it had no authority to 
control the manufacturer of the pool); and Commerce and Industry Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp (1999) (non-profit 
trade association setting fire safety standards owed no duty to owners of property that was damaged in a 
warehouse fire because it had no control over which of its minimum standards were incorporated into 
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patients who contracted HIV/AIDS after receiving a blood transfusion with HIV 
contaminated blood. The defendant in these actions of personal injury or wrongful 
death was the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB), a private, not-for-
profit trade association setting national standards for blood banking and blood 
transfusion services. It was alleged that AABB had failed to timely implement 
changes in its standards to ensure that its member blood banks employed 
surrogate testing or alternative practices that could prevent the collection and 
distribution of contaminated blood at the time it became clear that HIV could 
spread by transfusion. 
 
The first in this line of cases, Snyder v. AABB, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
carefully assessed the role the SDO played in the blood-banking industry. The 
Supreme Court held that by the time the plaintiff received the contaminated 
transfusion AABB ‘exerted considerable influence over the practices and 
procedures over its member banks’ and ‘[i]n many respects, the AABB wrote the 
rules and set the standards for voluntary blood banks’.30 Such dominance was 
fostered by AABB’s annual inspection and accreditation of its members to assure 
compliance with its standards, its presentation as an industry leader in setting 
policy and standards of practice,31 as well as the strong deference of federal and 
local governments to AABB standards and inspection results.32 In holding that 
AABB owed a duty of care to recipients of blood transfusions the Supreme Court 
further gave weight to the fact that its standards were not only adopted for the 
benefit of the industry, but also for patients, who had to rely on those standards 
for the safety of donor blood.33 The court also considered the risk of contracting 
HIV/AIDS through transfusions of contaminated blood both foreseeable and 
severe given the available government reports and scientific publications.34 
Considerations of policy and justice as raised by AABB could not trump the 
existence of a duty of care.35 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held, the trial jury 
could have found that AABB had been negligent in not recommending in its 
standards surrogate testing and that this negligence was a substantial factor in 
causing the plaintiff to contract HIV/AIDS. AABB was held liable to pay damages 
in excess of USD 400.000. 
 
                                                        
30 Snyder v. AABB (1996).  
31 Id., 1048 (‘Society has not thrust on the AABB its responsibility for the safety of blood and blood products. 
The AABB has sought and cultivated that responsibility. For years, it has dominated the establishment of 
standards for the blood-banking industry. (…) By words and conduct, the AABB invited blood banks, 
hospitals, and patients to rely on the AABB's recommended procedures.’) 
32 Id., 1040 (‘Both the state and federal government, as well as the blood-banking industry, generally accept 
AABB standards as authoritative. Consequently, blood banks throughout the nation rely on those 
standards.’) and at 1043 (‘Thus, if a blood bank failed the annual AABB inspection on the taking of medical 
histories, that bank could lose its [state] license to operate in New Jersey. In sum, (…) the AABB was not a 
mere advisory body. It exercised control of its member banks (…)’). 
33 Id., 1048 (‘Blood banks, hospitals, and patients rely on the AABB for the safety of the nation's blood 
supply. A patient contemplating surgery cannot assure the safety of blood drawn from others. Of necessity, 
patients rely on others, including the AABB, for that assurance.’) 
34 Id., 1048-1049. 
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Snyder was followed by courts in Louisiana, New York and Virginia.36 It was 
rejected, however, by the California Court of Appeals in N.N.V. v. AABB.37 In this 
case, which involved a minor who contracted AIDS after receiving a contaminated 
donor blood during surgery, the Court ruled that liability should not be imposed 
on AABB as a matter of public policy and fairness. In reaching that conclusion it, 
by and large, rejected all factors that were considered relevant in Snyder to 
establish a duty of care, and in particular AABB’s dominance in the sector and 
patients’ reliance on AABB standards for their safety. In Snyder, AABB had 
advanced the argument that it should not be found liable ‘for taking the “wrong 
side” of a debate involving medical uncertainties and public policy.’38 The 
California Court of Appeals agreed and placed strong emphasis on the lack of 
medical or scientific consensus regarding the effectiveness of available methods 
and practices to reduce the risk of HIV/AIDS contamination via blood transfusion. 
Such absence made it not reasonable foreseeable that the promotion of new 
testing methods in its standards would have reduced the risk of AIDS contraction 
for the plaintiff. This state of evolving knowledge also led the court to hold that 
imposing liability on the SDO would not further the goal of preventing future harm 
under the circumstances.39  
 
Moreover, the court considered in its no-duty decision, AABB had to balance the 
legitimate concern of the safety of blood supply against the equally legitimate 
concern of the availability of blood to needing patients and the costs of rejecting 
unaffected blood through new testing methods. As the implications for availability 
and costs of blood supply were unknown, AABB’s conduct ‘warrants no moral 
blame’.40 The court also expressed the fear that AABB would be exposed to an 
extensive burden of litigation if a duty of care were to be imposed. Opening the 
floodgates would also have a chilling effect on the SDO and would be detrimental 
for the community in that the SDO would be held back to further pursue its 
standard setting activities, which support otherwise laudable public policy goals 
                                                        
36 Weigand v. University Hospital of New York (1997) 399 (AABB’s motion to dismiss is denied); Douglass v. 
Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation (1997) (overturning a summary judgment in favor of AABB); and Jappell 
v. AABB (2001) 481 (AABB’s motion to dismiss is denied). 
37 N.N.V. (1999), 1388-1392. 
38 Snyder (1996), 1049. 
39 N.N.V. (1999), 1383. 
40 Id., 1382-1383. The Snyder court had dismissed this argument by holding that such concerns should not 
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such as health and safety.41 Finally, the costs of taking out insurance against such 
liability could also be high.42 
 
The previous analysis suggests that courts, in determining the threshold issue of 
duty in a negligence action, consider primarily the foreseeability of harm as a 
result of the SDO’s conduct and the closeness of the connection between its 
standard-setting activities and the plaintiff’s harm. The ability to control or direct 
compliance with its standards by the standards’ addressees (e.g. by mandating 
compliance on SDO members or administering a certification and accreditation 
scheme for the purposes of monitoring compliance) will normally show such 
foreseeability and/or close connection. Alternatively, the fact that the standards 
enjoy government endorsement in (agency) regulations or guidelines and that the 
SDO represents itself to the public as an industry leader for the development of 
standards may serve to demonstrate the two factors.43 Other considerations of 
policy and justice may nonetheless weigh against imposing on an SDO a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in the promulgation of its standards under the 
circumstances. Courts have, in similar wording as the California Court of Appeals 
in N.N.V., drawn attention to the societal importance of promulgating standards 
and argued that this function should not be hindered by exposing SDOs to liability 
in order to support their no-duty decisions.44 
C. The Voluntary Undertaking Rule 
An alternative way to impose a duty on SDOs and subject them to potential tort 
liability is by applying the rules concerning the American common law doctrine 
on affirmative duties. American common law, like English law, makes a distinction 
                                                        
41 N.N.V. (1999), 1384 (‘If liability were imposed here, then the AABB and other similar medical associations 
could be faced with a significant burden of litigation that might be impossible to avoid’) and at 1386-1387 
(‘[W]e believe imposition of liability here would have adverse consequences to the public by chilling 
scientific and medical debate on important issues (…) Additionally, we note imposition of liability could 
hinder reconsideration of established standards.’). See in the same vein Feldmeier 1999, 795 (arguing that 
the result of cases like Snyder could be ‘an unwarranted expansion of liability that could have the 
detrimental effect of discouraging trade association standards setting’) and Heidt 2010, 1254-1255 (noting 
that cases like Snyder ‘herald an area of increased liability’ and raise ‘the spector of unlimited liability once a 
duty was imposed’). Contra, Weigand v. University Hospital of New York (1997), in which the Supreme Court 
of New York County held that ‘the parties who would be covered by a duty on the part of the industry trade 
association were specifically foreseeable, i.e., the recipients of blood collected and screened according to the 
trade association standards by member blood banks complying with those standards. Imposition on the 
trade association of a duty of care to those blood recipients would not expose the trade association to 
liability to the public at large and its liability would be within manageable limits.’ (at 400). 
42 N.N.V. (1999), 1388. 
43 See Snyder (1996) (citations at footnotes 30 and 31 above) and Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
American Plywood Ass’n (1994), 3 (trade association developing standards for plywood roofing construction 
and nailing patterns owes a duty to exercise due care in promulgating it standards vis-à-vis homeowners 
who incurred extensive property damage as a result of a hurricane because these standards enjoyed wide 
public law recognition and the association had made representations to the public as the world leading 
expert body in the field). 
44 See e.g. Meyers v. Donnatacci (1987), 404 (non-profit swimming pool trade association owed no duty to a 
swimmer who sustained diving injury for it had no authority to control the manufacturers of the pool and 
imposing such a duty would undermine the many laudable purposes that organizations such as these serve 
in society) and Bailey (1999), 183 (citing Meyers favorably in holding that a non-profit trade association 
setting standards for the design and construction of wood trusses used for roof framing systems owed no 
duty to severely injured construction workers). See also Commerce and Industry Ins. Co. (1999) (as 
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between misfeasance and nonfeasance for the purposes of establishing whether 
the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff. Whereas misfeasance – 
understood as active conduct working positive harm to others – generally creates 
a duty of care in relation to physical harm, nonfeasance – held to be passive 
inaction to protect from harm – does not.45 Thus, if the defendant does not directly 
create the risk of harm for others, the failure to prevent or minimize that risk does 
not normally expose him to liability. Nonfeasance is not a tort, unless there is a 
duty to act imposed on the defendant in specific circumstances.46 Put differently, 
affirmative duties (i.e. duties to protect others from pre-existing risk of harm) only 
exist in special circumstances. Courts have been able to shield SDOs from liability 
by reference to the distinction between malfeasance and nonfeasance. By 
strategically characterizing the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the SDO’s conduct 
as nonfeasance (or omission), some courts have argued that no duty of care was 
owed in negligence in the absence of any special circumstances.47 
 
However, one of the special circumstances that has enabled courts to impose an 
affirmative duty on an SDO is when it voluntarily undertakes to perform an 
activity that is aimed at reducing the risk of harm for another caused by some 
other source. American common law then allows the imposition of a duty of care 
on the SDO vis-à-vis the other or even to third parties. One articulation of this so-
called ‘voluntary undertaking’ rule is found in Section 43 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts:  
 
An actor who undertakes to render services to another and who knows or 
should know that the services will reduce the risk of physical harm to 
which a third person is exposed has a duty of reasonable care to the third 
person in conducting the undertaking if:  
 
(a) the failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm 
beyond that which existed without the undertaking,  
(b) the actor has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the 
third person, or  
(c) the person to whom the services are rendered, the third party, or 
another relies on the actor’s exercising reasonable care in the 
undertaking.48 
                                                        
45 Keeton et al. 1984, §56, at 373. 
46 See in general Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, §25.1, at 615 and Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability 
for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 37 (2010). 
47 See e.g. Meyers (1987), 401 (New Jersey Superior Court interpreting the claim against the SDO as 
allegations concerning the failure to take action to prevent harm resulting from shallow water diving while 
being aware of the correlation between the two, and not that the standards the SDO undertook to set were 
inaccurate, false or improper). See also People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc. (2003), 21 (granting a motion 
for summary judgment by trade associations in the gun industry after holding that the claim is premised on 
nonfeasance and that the plaintiffs failed to present authority that these associations owed a duty to 
develop standards for gun safety design). 
48 Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 43 (2010). The rule can be 
traced back to Glanzer v. Shepard (1922) in which Justice Cardozo held: ‘One who assumes to act, even 
gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all’ (at 276). The rule 
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This guideline was previously laid down in similar wording in Section 324A 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which ‘has been widely recognized by the court’.49 
 
Plaintiffs have relied upon the voluntary undertaking rule to establish civil liability 
for standards development, frequently in parallel to actions in negligence.50 The 
service that is rendered concerns the development of product standards 
(including warnings) aimed to prevent or minimize risk of physical harm caused 
by dangerous products. The situation described under (a) suggests that an SDO 
has a duty of reasonable care in standards development when that activity leads 
to ‘some physical change to the environment or some other material alteration’ 
that increases the risk of physical harm.51 In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, courts have considered the risk to exist independently of any standards 
development. In Rountree v Ching Feng Blinds Industry Co. Ltd., for example, the US 
District Court of Alaska held that the risk of physical harm of strangulation posed 
by cords of window coverings does not vary as a function of the allegedly wrongful 
safety standards the Window Covering Manufacturers Association had developed 
to reduce the risk of injury to infants.52 The SDO’s failure to decrease that risk was 
not considered sufficient. This meant that even if the plaintiffs in this case, the 
parents of a deceased girl who got strangled in the inner cord of a window blind, 
would prove the inadequacy of the standards, a duty of care could not be imposed 
on the SDO following the rule under (a).53 
 
Applied to the context of product standardization, the situation set out under (c) 
of Section 43 of the Restatement subjects an SDO to a duty of care when the 
plaintiff shows that the manufacturer of the product that caused the physical harm 
(‘the other’) relied on negligently developed standards in the production or sale 
of that product, or, alternatively, that plaintiffs themselves (‘the third person’) 
placed such reliance on the standards when buying or using that product. 
Plaintiffs relying on this rule have seen their claims frequently defeated because 
of their inability to show that they (or the manufacturer of the dangerous product) 
actually relied on the negligently developed standards.54 In Sizemore v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., for example, the plaintiffs sought damages for personal injuries 
resulting from a fire that occurred in their home. They alleged that the Hardwood 
Plywood & Veneer Association (HPVA), a non-profit trade association for plywood 
manufacturers, had been conducive in promoting and adopting wrongful fire 
safety standards, with which the plywood paneling installed in their home 
                                                        
49 Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, §25.7, at 628 (with references to case law). See also the Reporters’ 
Note with Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 43, cmt. c (2010). 
50 In N.N.V. (1999) the plaintiff relied on Section 324A Restatement (Second) of Tort in its appeal against 
AABB’s summary judgment, which had been granted in first instance in relation to a negligence action. 
51 Patentas v. United States (1982), 717 (referring to Section 324A Restatement (Second) of Torts, cmt. c, 
Illustration 1). 
52 Rountree (2008), 808. 
53 Id., 808 (‘A standard or warning that explicitly accounted for the danger posed by the inner cord may 
have decreased the risk of injury to plaintiffs [but] it does not show that an inadequate standard increased 
the risk of harm to the third-party consumer’ (emphasis as in original)). 
54 Negligent misrepresentation actions have for the very same reason been denied. However, where SDOs 
engage in certification or accreditation plaintiffs are more successful in showing reliance, namely on the 
certificate, accreditation or any other label or seal attesting compliance with the product standards. See at 
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complied. It was clear from the file, however, that they had only learned about 
HPVA and the standards after the fire.55 
 
Most of the substantive discussion on the question of whether an SDO owes a duty 
to exercise reasonable care in standards development concerns the situation 
under (b). Such a duty exists, the Restatement proposes, if the SDO has undertaken 
to perform a duty one of its business members (i.e. a manufacturer or seller) owed 
to the plaintiff. In the case of developing product standards, the SDO must thus 
have assumed the duty manufacturers or sellers have to individuals or firms to 
produce or sell safe products. In determining whether that duty was indeed 
assumed, courts have frequently relied on the ‘control thesis’ discussed above and 
have made the determination of the duty element dependent on the SDO’s ability 
to control compliance with its standards by its membership, or in the industry 
more broadly.56 Again, the lack of such authority or control, for example due to the 
voluntary, non-binding legal status of the standards involved or the absence of any 
instruments to inspect and sanction non-compliance, is then frequently 
considered sufficient for a no duty decision.57 
 
In King v. National Spa and Pool Institute, Inc., however, the lack of control did not 
withhold the Alabama Supreme Court from imposing on the NSPI, a non-profit 
trade association which promulgated standards for the size, shape and 
dimensions of residential swimming pools, a duty to exercise due care under the 
voluntary undertaking rule as laid out in Section 324A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. In this case, the plaintiff‘s husband broke his neck after diving 
into his pool from the jump board. Some months later he died of pneumonia 
secondary to his injury. In previous claims involving diving injuries, courts in New 
Jersey and New York had forthrightly refused to accept that NSPI owed a duty to 
pool users based on the theory that it had no control over pool manufacturers or 
sellers.58 The Alabama Supreme Court held differently. Reading the case as 
premised on malfeasance rather than nonfeasance, it considered that NSPI ‘had no 
                                                        
55 Sizemore v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (1996), 8 (‘plaintiffs did not rely upon any publication or other activity 
on the part of HPVA, nor were they even aware that HPVA existed prior to suffering their injuries.’). See also 
e.g. Friedman v. F.E. Myers Co. (1989), (‘there is no evidence that plaintiffs relied on [the SDO’s] performance 
(…) Plaintiffs state that they had not read any allegedly false or misleading information or publication 
concerning PCBs in well pumps prior to the date of the incident’) at 383 (applying Section 323 Restatement 
(Second) of Torts). 
56 Cf. Commerce and Industry Ins. Co. (1999), 4 (‘Under the Restatement analysis advanced by plaintiffs, most 
courts have focused on the amount, if any, of control a trade association wields over the behavior of its 
members concerning, for example, the proper implementation of its standards.’) 
57 See e.g. Bailey (1999), 185 (a non-profit trade association developing standards for the design and 
construction of wood trusses used for roof framing systems owed no duty to severely injured construction 
workers since its ‘instructions were advisory’ and it ‘could not force the carpenters to abide by its admittedly 
general instructions’. See also Commerce and Industry Ins. Co. (1999), 4 (non-profit trade association setting 
fire safety standards owed no duty to owners of property that was damaged in a warehouse fire because it 
has no control over compliance with its standards as it ‘does not list, inspect, certify or approve any products 
or materials for compliance with its standards. It merely sets forth safety standards to be used as minimum 
guidelines that third parties may or may not choose to adopt, modify or reject.’). 
58 See Meyers (1987), 406 (‘NSPI had no authority to mandate compliance nor did it attempt to force its 
members to comply. It acted merely as a secretariat for its members; a forum where those who chose to make 
suggestions could do so. There were no penalties for failing to respond to the survey’) and Howard (1986), 
55 (‘NSPI did not have the duty or the authority to control the manufacturers who did produce the product 
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statutorily or judicially imposed duty to formulate standards’, but nonetheless did 
so voluntarily.59 It furthermore held that the SDO developed its standards for 
swimming pools having in mind ‘the needs of the consumer’ and had declared that 
safety was ‘one of the basic considerations upon which these design and 
construction standards are founded’.60 Under those circumstances the Supreme 
Court held that harm for consumers was foreseeable for NSPI if due care was not 
exercised in promulgating its standards.61 
 
The approach in King was confirmed by the Washington Court of Appeals in 
Meneely, in which NSPI was held liable for rendering a young swimmer 
quadriplegic who dove from a jump board into a pool, while it knew that the 
combination of the specific pool and board at hand posed a risk for certain divers 
and failed to amend its safety standards accordingly.62 While NSPI may not have 
had any formal control over compliance with its standards by the industry, NPSI 
members followed its standards out of economic imperative.63 The damages 
award against NSPI of $6.6 million, along with settlements in other cases, sent the 
SDO into insolvency.64  
 
Emerging from bankruptcy in 2004, NSPI was again faced with a personal injury 
action of an injured swimmer. In assessing the action, the courts in first instance 
and on appeal reaffirmed the control thesis, and held that NSPI owed no duty of 
care to the plaintiff. The US District Court in Georgia found at first instance that 
the ‘standards are voluntary, consensus standards’ and that the association ‘has 
no power to enforce compliance with those standards’ and ‘had no control over 
[the contractor’s] installation of the [plaintiff’s family] pool or over whether [the 
contractor] complied with the NSPI Standard when installing the pool’.65 The 
Eleventh Circuit Court confirmed these findings on appeal and added that NSPI 
did not owe a duty to warn consumers about the danger of swimming pools and 
diving boards covered by its standards following Section 324A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts: it did not increase the risk of diving injuries for swimmers, 
sufficient proof of actual reliance on NSPI standards was missing, and NSPI did not 
undertake to perform a duty owed by pool manufacturers to swimmers.66 
 
Applying the voluntary undertaking rule to impose a duty of care on an SDO finds 
it limit in the scope of the undertaking: What was it that the SDO voluntarily 
                                                        
59 King (1990), 614. 
60 Id., 615-616. 
61 Id., 616. See also Rountree (2008) in which the US District Court of Alaska considered (at 809) ‘It is of no 
consequence that [the SDO] did not have control over the blinds because [it] had control over the content of 
the warning. The warning itself provides a critical nexus between [the SDO], the manufacturer and the 
consumer.’ Instead, the court focused its duty analysis on a number of public policy factors, including 
foreseeability (at 810). 
62 Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc. (2000) (applying the Washington voluntary rescue doctrine, which is broadly 
similar to the rules proposed in the Restatement). 
63 Id., 57. 
64 See in detail Heidt 2010, 1231, at footnote 15. 
65 Lockman v. S.R. Smith, LLC (N.D.Ga. 2010), 7. 
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undertake to do?67 Courts have given particular importance to the addressees of 
the standards and the purpose for which the standards are developed, using both 
factors to argue either in favor or against the imposition of a duty.68 Thus, in no-
duty decisions courts have pointed to a limited undertaking by noting that the SDO 
develop standards for the purposes of sharing knowledge amongst peers in the 
industry, that it sought to address its membership exclusively, and that its 
standards were minimum standards only.69 In duty decisions, by contrast, courts 
have stressed the public interests involved in having adequate standards for third 
parties, namely for the health and safety of ultimate consumers of the products for 
which standards are set.70 
 
A second important limit in applying the voluntary undertaking rule is found in 
the courts’ sense of policy and justice. Even if a duty can be imposed on SDO’s 
following the voluntary undertaking rule, considerations of policy and justice may 
still trump the existence of a duty of care.71 Thus, again, considerations regarding 
the foreseeability of harm, the closeness of connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the plaintiff’s harm, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant and 
the consequences to the community if a duty is imposed, and the availability and 
cost of insurance to cover the risk involved.72 
D. Negligent misrepresentation 
Finally, plaintiffs who allegedly suffered harm caused by the standard-setting 
activities of SDOs have on several occasions brought a negligent 
misrepresentation action to recover their harms. Such action may enable plaintiffs 
who reasonably relied upon false information supplied to them by the defendant 
to obtain from it compensation for the physical or economic harm caused by that 
reliance. For those seeking to establish liability for physical harm the existence of 
the SDO’s duty of care is usually supported by the rules of a general action in 
negligence.73 The success of the claim, if recognized under state law,74 then turns 
                                                        
67 See e.g. Bailey (1999), 184 (‘Under the voluntary undertaking theory of liability, the duty of care to be 
imposed on a defendant is limited to the extent of the undertaking.’) and Rountree (2008), 809 (‘The court 
agrees that “the scope of one’s duty is limited by the scope of [their] undertaking.”’) 
68 See in general Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, §25.6, at 627. 
69 See e.g. Meyers (1987), 406 (‘Although NSPI rendered services to its member by providing a forum, NSPI 
did not assume the duty to warn consumers of the danger of shallow water diving which it recognized as 
necessary for the protection of a third party.’) 
70 See King (1990), 615-616 (citations at footnote 59 above) and Rountree (2008), 810 (‘[T]he objective of 
the ANSI standard sponsored by WCMA was "to reduce the possibility of injury, including strangulation, to 
young children from "the bead chain, cord, or any type of flexible loop device used to operate the product." 
This factor favors imposition of a duty.’) 
71 Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, §25.7, at 630 and Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm) § 43, cmt. b (2010). 
72 See e.g. Rountree (2008), 810-811 (considering that these policy considerations do not weigh against the 
imposition of a duty on an association of manufacturers of window covering which undertook to developed 
an ANSI national safety standard intended to address the strangulation hazard of window blinds). 
73 Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, § 43.3 (suggesting that actions to recover personal injury, property 
damage or emotional harm based on risks created by misrepresentation are best recognized as negligence 
actions). 
74 Not all states recognize an action of negligent misrepresentation resulting in physical harm. Compare e.g. 
Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (2001), 351 (explaining that Minnesota only recognizes negligent 
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on the questions whether the standards at issue were developed without 
exercising reasonable care and thus constituted false information, whether that 
information was actually and reasonably relied upon, and whether that reliance 
caused the physical harm. 
 
For those claiming pure economic loss, a duty of care not to be negligent in 
supplying information will not normally exist for an SDO, unless it has undertaken 
to perform such a duty for the plaintiff, or there is a special relationship (e.g. a 
fiduciary or confidential relationship) between the parties that led the plaintiff to 
expect that reasonable care would be exercised for its interests.75 Following the 
proposal of the Restatement, liability for stand-alone economic harm is limited to 
those for whose benefit and guidance the misinformation was supplied or to those 
the SDO knew the recipient intends to supply it.76 Once these elements are 
satisfied the questions regarding the inadequacy of the standards, actual and 
reasonable reliance, and causation must also be affirmatively answered if the 
claim is to prevail. 
 
Courts hearing actions of negligent misrepresentation against SDOs have 
dismissed these actions primarily because of the plaintiffs’ failure to establish that 
the SDO owed a duty to them, and that there was actual reliance on the standards. 
A case in point is Commerce and Industry Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp, which involved a 
fire that consumed an entire warehouse in New Orleans. The insurance company 
of a firm that had stored (and lost) its merchandise in the fire sought recovery of 
over $27 million it had paid to its insured. It thus brought a subrogation action 
against the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a not-for-profit, 
voluntary membership organization which developed and published model 
consensus codes and standards concerning fire safety. These standards are 
applied throughout the US and frequently incorporated in federal and state safety 
regulations. 
 
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the NFPA fire safety standards led the 
warehouse sprinklers system to be ineffective as they failed to provide accurate 
information on the distance between that system and a potential fuel source for a 
fire. Interpreting this allegation as a negligent misrepresentation claim, the US 
District Court in Louisiana considered that in the absence of a contract or fiduciary 
relationship, NFPA could only owe a duty to the plaintiff when the misinformation 
is directly communicated to the plaintiffs’ insured, the insured was part of the 
limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance the misinformation was 
supplied, and the insured actually relied on that information. However, there was 
no evidence that the plaintiff had any direct or indirect contact with NPFA, or that 
it even knew about the NFPA standards.77 Actual reliance upon those standards in 
                                                        
Unified Sch. Dist. (1997), 593 (holding that California recognizes the action based on the conditions set out 
in Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 311). 
75 Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, § 43.5. 
76 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm (2012) § 5, which sets rules that are ‘largely 
identical’ (Reporter’s note) to Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) § 552. Many courts have followed the 
Restatement analysis. See for an extensive list Kohola Agriculture v. Deloitte & Touche (1997), 159. 
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any business transaction the plaintiff undertook was therefore impossible.78 The 
court further reasoned that policy considerations weigh against imposing a duty 
of care on NFPA vis-à-vis third parties which occupied a building that was built by 
others in compliance with its standards. More specifically, it held that: 
 
“Promoting public safety by developing safety standards is an important, 
imperfect, and evolving process. The imposition of liability on a nonprofit, 
standards developer who exercises no control over the voluntary 
implementation of its standards under circumstances like those presented 
here could expose the association to overwhelming tort liability to parties 
with whom its relationship is nonexistent and could hinder the 
advancement of public safety.”79 
 
Where SDOs engage in certification and accreditation activities, however, they are 
at greater risk of incurring liability in a negligent misrepresentation action. A case 
in point is Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., which involved a fire 
extinguisher that exploded when put to use by an employee. An injured co-worker 
brought a claim in negligence and misrepresentation against the manufacturer 
and Underwriters’ Laboratories (UL). The latter had tested, for a fee and upon the 
manufacturer’s request, the type of fire extinguisher concerned. Using for that 
purpose its own standards for construction and performance, UL found the design 
of the extinguishers compliant and had publicly communicated this approval in its 
professional publications. UL also allowed the manufacturer to affix to the fire 
extinguishers a label declaring that it was UL tested and inspected.80  
 
UL had thus approved the defective design of the products based on its own 
standards. Saying otherwise would be ‘straining at words’, the US District Court in 
Delaware held.81 This meant that UL’s standards failed to ensure the safe use of 
the products, whereas UL ‘knew or should have known of construction and 
materials which would be required if the hazards involved in the use of the 
extinguishers were to be avoided.’82 UL certification was ‘unquestionably’ of aid 
to the manufacturer in selling the products and reliance on the certification was 
further bolstered by the statutory backing it had received in the local Fire 
Prevention Code.83 Liability for negligent misrepresentation could thus follow.84 
 
In Hempstead the court second-guessed the product standards UL had adopted. In 
other cases involving the liability of SDOs engaged in certification, courts have 
                                                        
78 See also Howard (1986), 52-53 (negligent misrepresentation action against NSPI is denied because the 
plaintiff had neither alleged reliance on NSPI’s activities when he dove in an above-ground pool, nor had he 
demonstrated that he belonged to the group of beneficiaries NSPI could reasonably have intended to rely on 
the information supplied, which presumably were only the manufacturers of pools). 
79 Commerce and Industry Ins. Co. (1999), 3. 
80 Hempstead (1967), 116-117. 
81 Id., 117. 
82 Id., 117. 
83 Id., 117 (‘The Fire Prevention Code authorized the Fire Prevention Supervisor to rely upon the services of 
any recognized testing authority, including Underwriters, to determine the suitability of a particular type of 
fire extinguisher, and a listing by any such authority permitted the Fire Prevention Supervisor to find such 
extinguisher suitable for installation.’) 
84 Id., 118. The success of the negligent misrepresentation action is not determined by the court in its 
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been more reluctant to review the substance of standards. Instead, their concerns 
have been with the accuracy of the certification process and the attestations of 
compliance that have been awarded.85 In these cases, the rationale for holding 
SDOs liable under the theory of negligent misrepresentation is no different from 
the rationale underpinning liability of certification bodies and other sorts of 
endorsers under such theory.86 That rationale is perhaps best expressed in 
Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., a California case establishing the liability of a certifier 
that had awarded the ‘Good Housekeeping Seal’ to ladies’ shoes that were 
extremely slippery when worn on certain floor coverings, and had so caused 
severe personal injury:  
 
‘Since the very purpose of respondent's seal and certification is to induce 
consumers to purchase products so endorsed, it is foreseeable certain 
consumers will do so, relying upon respondent's representations 
concerning them, in some instances, even more than upon statements 
made by the retailer, manufacturer or distributor. Having voluntarily 
involved itself into the marketing process, having in effect loaned its 
reputation to promote and induce the sale of a given product, the question 
arises whether respondent can escape liability for injury which results 
when the product is defective and not as represented by its 
endorsement.’87 
 
Thus, actions sounding in negligent misrepresentation have been largely defeated 
because of plaintiffs’ inability to show actual and detrimental reliance on the 
standards involved.88 This failure, as noted, has also led to the failure of actions 
based on the voluntary undertaking rule.89 However, if SDOs combine standard 
setting with certification activities, such as in Hempstead, the chances of such 
actions prevailing increase. After all, these activities provide public, expert-based 
representations on key characteristics of the certified product or producer itself 
that carry currency in commerce and serve to encourage individuals and firms to 
rely on its representations to buy or use the product. 
 
4. Perspectives from the EU 
 
It is striking to observe just how little case law has developed in the EU compared 
to the US on liability for the development of product standards. As Spindler notes, 
‘it is surprising that there is almost no case to be found [in the EU] that holds 
standardising organisations liable for standards which have been exceeded by 
                                                        
85 See e.g. Benco Plastics, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec Corp. (1974), 786; Groppel Co., Inc. v. United State Gypsum 
Co. (1981), 66 and; Rottinghaus v. Howell (1983) 907. 
86 See in general Rockwell 1992 and Belson 2017, 112-118 (each with further references to case law). See on 
accreditation bodies Schuck 1994, 188-191. 
87 Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. (1969), 684. See also United States Lighting Serv, Inc. v. Llerad Corp. (1992), finding 
that UL is required to act with ordinary care in the conduct of its certification process given the reliance placed 
in its mark by consumers and suggesting that it may incur liability for economic loss under the theory of 
negligent misrepresentation. 
88 See for a similar observation in relation to liability of accreditation bodies Schuck 1994, 188-191. 
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new knowledge’.90 Judicial control over private standards development in the EU 
has for the most part taken place in the context of EU internal market law (i.e. 
competition and free movement law),91 and judicial review at both the European92 
and Member State level.93 In addition, there is hardly any theorization in European 
legal scholarship about the civil liability of SDOs, how such liability relates to the 
liability of, for example, public regulators, individual professionals or collective 
associations engaged in standardization or certification, and what policy 
considerations should support or limit the imposition of liability on these actors.94 
This stance may be explained by the lack of case law on this issue, but also in part 
by the fact that tort law is principally regulated at the level of the EU Member 
States, where concepts and theories of liability vary notoriously along long-lasting 
national traditions of common and civil law, or mixes in between. In other words, 
no general EU framework exists that covers the liability of SDOs. 
 
Nevertheless, there are recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the EU that should be taken into consideration. To put these developments into 
perspective, this section will first briefly set out the legal framework that applies 
to EU standardization called the ‘New Approach’. It will then discuss the liability 
of SDOs for activities pursued within that framework. Finally, we will look beyond 
the scope of the New Approach and consider liability for the development of 
market-based product standards.95 
A. The New Approach 
Voluntary product standards in the EU are developed within the framework of the 
‘New Approach’. This legislative program was developed in the 1980s to improve 
the free movement of goods within the internal market.96 Within the program, the 
legislative institutions of the EU adopt secondary legislation that set out the 
‘essential requirements’ with which products have to comply to be lawfully traded 
                                                        
90 Spindler 1998, 331. 
91 See Mataija 2016, 233-244.  
92 In the recent case of James Elliott Construction Ltd. v. Irish Asphalt Ltd. (C-613/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:821) 
the Court of Justice of the EU held itself competent to review European harmonized standards developed 
within the legislative framework of the New Approach (see section C.1 below). This expansion of the Court’s 
jurisdiction to the domain of technical standardization has triggered a lively debate on the desirability of 
judicial control over standards development in Europe. See for more detailed analysis of the case its likely 
consequences see Lundqvist  (Chapter x in this volume); Volpato 2017. 
93 Schepel and Falke 2000, 131-134. 
94 Notable exceptions are Spindler 1998; Schepel 2005, 384-387; Cafaggi 2006, 58-73. 
95 Beyond the scope of inquiry is therefore the liability for certification activities under the New Approach. 
The breast implants scandal that unfolded around the French manufacturer of silicone breast implants Poly 
Implant Prothèse SA (PIP) has triggered various claims from victims against the certification body that 
inspected and approved PIP’s manufacturing processes within the New Approach framework, yet failed to 
discover the illegal use of substandard silicone gel to manufacture the implants. In 2017, the Court of Justice 
of the EU held in the case of Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH (C-219/15, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:128) that certification bodies conducting conformity assessments under the New Approach 
owe a general duty of care to end users of certified products ‘to act with all due diligence’ when performing 
such assessments (para 46). This implies that they have to be alert on non-compliance and must take 
appropriate action once they receive evidence that indicates that products may no longer be compliant. 
However, EU law does not offer a basis to hold liable these actors for breach of this duty and their liability 
must be established under the tort law regimes of the Member States. See in detail Verbruggen and Van 
Leeuwen 2018. 
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in the EU. The precise technical specifications are then laid down in a European 
harmonized standard that is developed by European standardization 
organizations – CEN, CENELEC or ETSI.97 After the European Commission has 
published a reference to this voluntary standard in the Official Journal of the EU, a 
presumption arises that products that comply with the standard also comply with 
the essential requirements of the relevant EU legislation. As such, establishing 
compliance with a European harmonized standard has become the principal way 
for manufacturers to show that their products comply with the law. Although it is 
possible for manufacturers to demonstrate legal compliance through other means, 
in practice most manufacturers opt to show compliance with the European 
standard.98 
 
Regulation 1025/2012/EU, which since 2012 constitutes the legal framework 
underlying the New Approach, recognizes CEN, CENELEC and ETSI as the 
European standardization organizations.99 These SDOs are no institution or 
agency of the European Union, however. CEN and CENELEC are private not-for-
profit associations (association internationale sans but lucrative) under Belgian 
law.100 ETSI is also a private non-profit association, but is incorporated in 
France.101 This means that the liability of the three European standardization 
organizations is governed by Belgian and French tort law, and not by EU law.102 
The liability of national SDOs that are members of CEN, CENELEC and ETSI is 
equally governed by national tort law. These national SDOs participate in the 
creation of European harmonized standards and implement them at the national 
level, that is, they translate the standards and make them available, usually upon 
payment of a fee. The national SDOs are free to engage in the development of 
standards outside the scope of New Approach. The development of such market-
based standards in areas like cyber security, environmental sustainability and 
worker safety now constitutes an important business activity for many. In that 
domain they compete against trade associations, NGOs and other standards 
developers at both national and international levels. 
B. Liability Under the New Approach 
Only very few national courts in the EU have been concerned with claims involving 
the liability of SDOs, both within and beyond the New Approach. Strict liability for 
personal injury and property damage caused by defective products is not the 
proper basis for bringing such claims. In the EU, this domain of tort law is 
                                                        
97 CEN (European Committee for Standardization), CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization) and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) develop standards for 
different sectors.  
98 Schepel 2013, 528.  
99 Article 2(8) read in conjunction with Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation [2012] OJ L 316/12. 
100 CEN (2015) and CENELEC (2015). CEN and CENELEC have as their membership national standardization 
bodies of the EU Member States and a number of additional European countries. 
101 ETSI (2017). ETSI has over 800 members including standardization bodies, government representatives, 
trade associations and individual businesses. 
102 More specifically, Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) governs the tort liability 
of institutions or agencies of the EU. It reads: ‘In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage 
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exclusively regulated by the Product Liability Directive, unless pre-existing special 
liability regimes apply.103 The Directive, as implemented by the EU Member States, 
imposes such liability on business actors that fall within the scope of the 
‘producer’ concept as set out in Article 3 of the Directive. While this concept 
‘embraces a wide range of actors’, it does not extend to those that are not involved 
in the manufacturing, sale or distribution of products.104 Accordingly, SDOs fall 
outside the scope of the Directive.105 Similar to the US, liability claims against these 
private actors in Europe must be brought under theories of negligence to prevail. 
 
A comprehensive comparative study commissioned by the European Commission 
and the European Free Trade Association called ‘Legal Aspects of Standardisation’ 
concluded as regards the potential of tort law to hold liable SDOs for negligent 
standard setting ‘even though the theoretical possibility is open in all jurisdictions 
under discussion here, France and Italy seem to be the only Member States where 
it has actually happened’.106 The Italian case involved the alleged violation of 
intellectual property rights for the use of geographical denominations by the 
national standards body as it developed a new standard to compete with an 
existing one. The outcome of the case was unknown at the time of this writing.107 
 
In France, the liability of the national SDO for technical standards called 
Association Française de Normalisation (AFNOR), is a matter for the administrative 
courts since AFNOR is considered to fulfil a public law function (mission de service 
public) when developing technical standards in fields covered by New Approach 
legislation.108 The comparative study reports just one tort law claim brought 
against AFNOR. In the case, AFNOR had licensed a manufacturer of a certain type 
of concrete pavement to use its conformity mark ‘NF’. After a very severe winter, 
however, these pavements had cracked. The manufacturer was held liable by the 
municipalities where the defective pavements had been placed and by the 
contractors that placed them there. The manufacturer enjoined AFNOR in the 
proceedings and sued for damages for developing ‘inadequate’ standards. The 
Tribunal Administrative de Paris denied the claim. First, it upheld AFNOR’s 
exclusion clause included in the license contract for use of its NF mark, implying 
that it could not be held liability for all defects in products that were awarded that 
mark. Second, it considered AFNOR not to be at fault given that its standards 
cannot be held to cover all characteristics of a product. Moreover, once AFNOR 
became aware of the problems concerned, it amended the relevant standard.109 
 
                                                        
103 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ L 210, 
7.8.1985, p. 29), Directive as last amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (OJ L 141, 4 Jun. 1999, p 20), Article 13. 
104 Weatherill 2013, 175. 
105 Some commentators have presented arguments to suggest that standards could be seen as a ‘product’ 
within the scope of the Product Liability Directive. By extension, SDOs could then be considered ‘producer’. 
So far, none of these arguments have been considered by the Court of Justice of the EU in the interpretation 
of the Product Liability Directive. See for a discussion: Stuurman and Wijnands 2000, 617-618. 
106 Schepel and Falke 2000, 238.  
107 See Menchetti 2000, 540. 
108 Conseil d’État, No. 73230 (1992). See also Décret No. 2009-697 of 16 June 2009 relatif à la normalisation. 
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If the national SDO is awarded a specific legal status or special powers by national 
statute or decree, its liability for standardization and certification activities is 
typically governed by rules on state liability in so far as it acts within the scope of 
that status or powers. While immunity from liability is rarely accepted in Europe, 
policy considerations may put more stringent demands on the conditions of duty 
and breach (or any equivalent under national tort law) when SDOs make use of 
their public law status or powers.110 These considerations may thus further limit 
the risk of liability these SDOs face.111 
 
The apparent insignificance of the theme of SDO liability in the case law of national 
courts in the EU hides the fact that, in practice, SDOs are concerned about the risk 
of incurring liability for their standard-setting activities. The cited study on ‘Legal 
Aspects of Standardisation’ reports that several SDOs operating under the New 
Approach have taken out liability insurance.112 Others try to exonerate themselves 
in general terms of sale or service.113 The Dutch NEN (Nederlands Normalisatie 
Instituut), takes a rather defensive approach and includes in its general conditions 
of sale sweeping indemnity clauses that require its contracting parties, for which 
NEN undertakes to perform services such as standards development or 
certification, to indemnify it for any civil liability vis-à-vis third parties caused by 
the performance of the contract, including violations of intellectual property 
rights, privacy laws or any other laws and regulations that are in force (Articles 
5.3 and 12.6). NEN further limits its contractual liability by limiting the extent of 
damages to its insurance coverage (Article 12.2), excluding liability for indirect 
damages (Articles 12.3 – 12.4) and damages related to any printing errors in the 
materials provided by the contracting party (Article 12.5), and by setting the 
limitation period to three months after the damage manifested (Article 12.7).114 
The NEN internal regulations also include a general clause exonorating NEN from 
liability for direct or indirect damages against members caused by or in relation 
to its norms (Article 10.2.2).115 
 
The British Standards Institute (BSI) seemingly admitted that it owes a duty of 
care to anyone relying on its standards in the first version of its ‘Standard for 
Standards’ publication.116 In the version currently in force, this magnanimous 
assumption of a duty can no longer be found.117 The study on ‘Legal Aspects of 
Standardisation’ also reported the German Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN) 
to admit to a duty of care (Garantenstellung) to users of its standards in its ground 
                                                        
110 Van Dam 2013, 532. 
111 Schepel and Falke 2000, 239. 
112 Id., 238. 
113 See for ANFOR’s terms and condition of sale ANFOR (2018), Article 9.   
114 NEN (2016). 
115 NEN (2005). The validity of these limitation and exclusion clauses may be questioned. In business-to-
business relationships they may be allowed only where the extent to which the liability is limited is not 
disproportionate to the loss incurred. In business-to-consumer dealings, however, they are likely to be 
challengeable under EU consumer law, in particular Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts OJ L 95/29. See for a discussion of this EU Directive, its implementation in 
commercial and consumer law in England and Wales, and the extensive case law developed on it by the 
Court of Justice of the EU: Lawson 2017. 
116 BS 0: 1997 A Standard for Standards, Part 2 – Recommendations for committee procedures, Section 
6.9.1.5. 
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rules for standardization that were previously in force.118 Still, the reporters of the 
study considered, the risk of the British and German SDOs incurring liability is 
relatively low since they have put in place several procedural safeguards that 
would mitigate against a breach of the duty.119 Such safeguards include ensuring 
participation of interested stakeholders and knowledgeable experts in standards 
development, having available to these actors all relevant technical and scientific 
information, and ensuring that standards are developed for the common good and 
not for individual commercial benefit.120 The AFNOR case discussed above 
demonstrates that it is also helpful in this respect to have in place a review 
procedure once shortcomings have become clear.  
C. Liability Beyond the New Approach 
In the absence of a common legal framework on tort liability and the limited 
discussion in European legal scholarship about liability for standards 
development, the landscape regarding such liability can be said to be even 
sketchier beyond and within the New Approach framework. The reach of EU law 
is generally limited here and divergent national regimes of liability hold sway. 
While tort claims against SDOs have reached the supreme courts of (some) 
Member States, these claims first and foremost disputed the certification activities 
the SDOs were engaged in, rather than standards development.121 Liability for 
standards development is extremely rare and plaintiffs may not be able to meet 
the elements that national tort laws require for their actions to prevail. 
 
In English law, for example, considerations around the existence of a duty of care 
will defeat most claims as it does in American common law. The leading case law 
of the Supreme Court on the tort of negligence and on negligent misstatements 
suggests that no such duty exists because of a lack of a sufficiently proximate 
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant SDO, or the absence of the 
assumption of a responsibility by the SDO on which the plaintiff reasonably 
relied.122 Policy factors concerning the public role of SDOs in society as non-profit 
organizations promoting the collective welfare and the consequences in terms of 
liability exposure for SDOs and their public role if a duty were imposed would 
further militate against a duty being recognized.123  
                                                        
118 Schepel and Falke 2000, 240-241. 
119 Id., 241-242. 
120 See e.g. BSI 2017 and DIN ‘DIN 820-1. Normungsarbeit – Teil 1: Grundsätze‘. 
121 See e.g. for England and Wales Marc Rich & Co AG and others v. Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd. and others 
(1995) (held: a classification society does not owe a duty of care to cargo owners arising from negligent 
inspections of a damaged ship); for France Cour de Cassation, No. 06-19.521 (2007) (held: a certifier is not 
liable for economic losses caused by a defect that arose in a certified television within the period of 
warranty set by the producer); for Germany Bundesgerichtshof, VII ZR 36/14 (2017) (a certifier is not liable 
for personal injury caused by defective breast implants if the manufacturer of the implants had used 
materials not intended to be used for manufacturing such medical devices and had fraudulently concealed 
that use from the certifier); and for the Netherlands Hoge Raad Strawberry Mite (2007) (a certifier is liable 
for pure economic loss sustained by a strawberry farmer and caused by the violation of its own certification 
protocol for pest control in horticulture products). 
122 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. (1964); Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman (1990); and 
most recently Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SPA v. Playboy Club London Ltd. & others (2018). 
123 Cf. Marc Rich (1995), 12-13 (Per Lord Lloyd of Berwick) and 28 (Per Lord Steyn). Contra, Perrett v. 
Collins (1998) (aircraft inspector owes a duty to aircraft passengers to act with reasonable care so to ensure 
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In civil law countries, in particular those that may be considered to stand in the 
Napoleonic tradition (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain), the duty 
element in negligence liability (or any equivalent concept used) does not involve 
the same kind of considerations as in American or English common law. 
Nonetheless, considerations around the foreseeability of the type of plaintiff’s 
harm, the closeness of connection between the SDO’s conduct and the harm, and 
the societal function of standard-setting are likely to surface in the determination 
of breach and legal causation.124 Accordingly, breach and causation serve as the 
main control mechanisms to guard against overly burdensome liability for SDO. 
These elements are, unlike in the US, decided by judges only.  
 
Importantly, however, violations of EU law may serve as a catalyst of liability 
claims against SDOs based on national tort law. The case of Fra.bo v. DVGW, a 
German case which concerns the civil liability for product standardization and 
certification activities, may serve to illustrate that role.125 Fra.bo was an Italian 
manufacturer of copper fittings used for water and gas piping. These copper 
fittings, which fell outside the scope of the New Approach legislation regulating 
the sale of construction materials in the EU, serve to make piping water tight and 
airtight. To sell these fittings in Germany, Fra.bo applied for certification by a 
German non-profit association called DVGW (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches eV). DVGW adopts technical standards for the performance of 
construction materials used in the gas and water sector and certifies products on 
that basis. Initially DVGW awarded Fra.bo certification of its copper fittings for 
both the water and gas sector. This award essentially revolved around compliance 
of the fittings with DVGW’s technical standard ‘Worksheet W534’, which specified 
the norms that products that come in contact with water have to meet in order to 
attain certification. Fra.bo applied for DVGW certification since such certification 
would show conformity with mandatory national product safety law. While in 
theory other certifications were available, in practice DVGW was the only body 
Fra.bo could turn to have its fittings certified. 
 
Fra.bo’s certification was soon subject to a re-assessment procedure because a 
competitor had complained to DVGW that it was technically impossible to satisfy 
the quality standards for water and gas supply by one and the same type of fitting, 
as Fra.bo did. As a result of that procedure DVGW no longer accepted the positive 
test results provided by a state-accredited Italian laboratory upon the request of 
Fra.bo, whereas the same laboratory had also provided the test results that 
initially led DVGW to grant Fra.bo certification. Furthermore, DVGW amended its 
technical standard W534 by introducing a test consisting of exposing the copper 
fitting to a temperature of 110 degrees Celsius in boiling water for 3,000 hours, 
                                                        
protocol). The latter case suggests that the duty element in personal injuries actions is not insurmountable 
in actions against inspectors or certifiers. The position of the developer of aircraft safety standards, here the 
government, was not addressed.  
124 See in general Van Dam 2013, 208-217 (discussing the different policies and control mechanisms used in 
English, France and Germany law to limit the scope of protection offered by tort law in the context of pure 
economic loss).  
125 Fra.bo v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (2012). See for a comprehensive overview of 
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claiming this was needed to ensure a longer life cycle for certified products. The 
conditions for certification as included in the contractual arrangement between 
DVGW and Fra.bo required that if a technical standard was amended, certificate 
holders must apply for a renewal of their certification. Fra.bo did not make such 
an application and as a result DVGW withdrew Fra.bo’s certification. In response, 
Fra.bo brought a damages claim against DVGW for breach of contract and EU law. 
It argued, among other things, that the introduction of the 3,000-hour test was 
arbitrary and had no other goal than to limit access to the German market. 
Moreover, there was no reason to deny the Italian test results since these were 
produced according to the procedures DVGW had itself stipulated.126 Accordingly, 
Fra.bo argued, DVGW violated EU rules on competition and free movement of 
goods in the performance of its obligations under the certification contract.  
 
The district court denied the claim. The court hearing the appeal referred several 
preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the EU as it was unsure how to 
interpret and apply the EU law rules concerned. In delivering its judgment, the 
European Court of Justice held that the standardization and certification activities 
of DVGW are covered by the EU rules on free movement of goods, which prohibits 
the imposition of measures by Member States that limit the import of products 
from other Member States. Even though DVGW is a private association, the Court 
applied a functional approach and considered that it restricted the free movement 
of goods ‘in the same manner as do measures imposed by the State’.127 German 
product safety law indeed held that DVGW certification signified legal compliance. 
DVGW was also the only body capable of certifying Fra.bo’s copper fittings for the 
application at issue, whereas the lack of such certification constituted a significant 
restriction for companies seeking to market their products in Germany.128 
Therefore, the Court concluded, DVGW ‘in reality holds the power to regulate the 
entry into the German market’.129  
 
The judgement of the Court of Justice has attracted significant scholarly attention 
for its importance regarding the internal coherency of EU free movement law,130 
for its implications on the New Approach framework,131 and for the way in which 
the Court has strengthened judicial review in the field of technical 
standardization.132 Our principal interest in this chapter -- the civil liability of 
SDOs for standardization and certification activities -- has been of far less concern 
to scholars.133 In concrete terms, for DVGW the Fra.bo judgment meant that it 
needed to be able to justify the adoption of the 3,000-hour test and its refusal to 
recognize testing results from an accredited laboratory in another Member State. 
In more general terms, it was challenged to provide justifications for the adoption 
of stricter standards and (de)certification decisions that harm the economic 
                                                        
126 Cf. Landgericht Köln (2008), paras 31, 32 and 36. 
127 Fra.bo (2012), para 26. 
128 Id. paras 27-30. 
129 Id. para 31. 
130 See e.g. Van Harten and Nauta 2013; Van Leeuwen 2013; Mataija 2016, 246-250. 
131 See e.g. Chapter x in this volume (Lundqvist); Schepel 2013. 
132 See e.g. Van Gestel and Micklitz 2013.  
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interest of firms like Fra.bo. If it cannot provide these, liability for damages may 
arise, either in contract or in tort.  
 
After the Court of Justice of the EU rendered its judgment, the referring court of 
appeal in Germany held that DVGW was liable vis-à-vis Fra.bo for breach of 
contract. The national court considered that the DVGW performance standards for 
product certification in the water sector, including the 3,000-hour test, were 
contrary to the free movement of goods, as these could restrict the import of goods 
otherwise lawfully traded in other Member States. DVGW could not make the 
continuity of Fra.bo certification dependent on the meeting of that test. 
Accordingly, the revocation of Fra.bo’s certification was without any ground and 
unlawful.134 Moreover, DVGW was wrong to discard the testing results provided 
by an accredited laboratory in another Member State since this is contrary to the 
mutual recognition principle underpinning EU free movement law.135 
 
DVGW’s breach of the rules on the free movement of goods, the court of appeal 
further reasoned, could not be justified. The protection of public health, as DVGW 
claimed, did not serve as an appropriate justification for the adoption of the 3,000-
hour test. The SDO failed to provide evidence that the adoption of the new 
standard was instrumental to such protection, for example by offering a detailed 
risk analysis of the hazards it claimed to control by introducing the test, that is, 
bacterial contamination of water or gas explosions caused by failing copper 
fittings. Apparently, such risks did not play any role when DVGW adopted the new 
standard. Moreover, the decision to fix the duration of the test at 3,000 hours was 
unsubstantiated. DVGW did not sufficiently establish that the test is the accepted 
state-of-the-art, which might as well be shorter (or longer) than 3,000 hours.136 
Accordingly, DVGW unlawfully and negligently withdrew Fra.bo’s certification, 
which likely caused the latter’s (pure economic) losses consisting in the loss of 
profit it could have made the period in which it was cut off from the German 
market.137 
 
The case of Fra.bo neatly demonstrates how national private law and EU public 
law complement each other in the regulation of technical standardization and 
certification in the EU. As shown, a civil damages claim gave rise to a discussion of 
whether EU rules applied and were violated. While in this case the rules at stake 
concerned free movement of goods, in others it may involve rules of competition 
law or non-discrimination. After the Court of Justice established that EU rules did 
apply, the national court held that these rules were violated in the performance of 
contractual obligations, thus giving rise to a remedy in private law. Clearly, in 
Fra.bo it was contract law that provided the plaintiff with a remedy against the 
SDO, but had a contractual relationship been absent between the two, as is usually 
the case in standards development, an action in tort could have provided the 
means for addressing any allegedly wrongful activities. More generally, any 
breach of EU law that is directly applicable to the activities of an SDO and that is 
                                                        
134 Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (2013), paras 48-50. 
135 Id., para 54. 
136 Id., para 63-64. 
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protective of the interests of the actor affected by those activities (i.e. EU free 
movement law of persons and services, competition law or non-discrimination 
law), constitutes a ground to bring a claim in tort against the SDO.138 Tort law 
constitutes a key branch of the law to privately enforce those EU law rules at the 
national level and can, as such, be said to contribute in significant ways to the 
regulation of standards development in the EU.  
 
5. Comparative analysis 
 
The previous discussions highlight a number of themes worthy of further 
comparative analysis. The research questions set out in the introduction, as 
further developed in Section A, guide the analysis. 
A. Duty Considerations in Negligence Law 
Liability for standards development in the US and EU is established exclusively on 
theories based in negligence. Central to all actions sounding in negligence, the 
voluntary undertaking rule or negligent misrepresentation in the US are 
considerations around the existence of a duty of care. The duty element proofs to 
be a formidable requirement that the plaintiffs in the majority of these actions fail 
to meet. Considerations to impose on the defendant SDO a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in promulgating standards have frequently turned on the 
question to what extent the SDO exercises control over the standards’ addressees 
to comply with its standards. In these actions, control is then seen a necessary 
proxy for establishing the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff as a result of the 
development of standards and/or the closeness of the connection between that 
activity and the plaintiff’s harm.139 Such control can follow from any legal 
arrangement (e.g. contracts, rules of association, bylaws) that enables the SDO to 
mandate the standards, or the SDO’s administration of a certification or 
accreditation scheme that monitors compliance with its standards amongst 
addressees. The SDO’s lack of such leverage over compliance with its standards 
usually leads to a no-duty decision. 
 
An obvious criticism against this reasoning is that, in practice, members routinely 
follow SDO standards in their business operations. Even without formal control, 
compliance rates are usually high amongst SDO members. A number of courts in 
the US have therefore rightly looked beyond the control thesis and have sought to 
establish a duty of care by reference to the degree to which the standards enjoy a 
high level of market uptake, receive government endorsement, and to public 
representations made by the SDO as regards its expertise in developing standards 
in the field.140 Considerations of whether the standards serve the purpose of 
                                                        
138 Verbruggen 2017b, 59-71. 
139 The exponent of this position perhaps is Meyers (1987), in which a New Jersey Superior Court granted 
summary judgment for NSPI because ‘the crucial element of foreseeability is lacking’ upon the finding that 
the SDO ‘had absolutely no power to force a member to comply with its promulgated standards’ (at 403). 
140 See e.g. Meneely (2000), 56; Snyder (1996), 1040 and 1048; and Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. 
(1994), 3. In Beasock (1985), however, the court admitted that the SDO’s dimensional standards for tires, 
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protecting third parties against personal injury or property damage have been 
further added to the mix of relevant circumstances that justify the imposition of a 
duty.141 In the EU, the Fra.bo case has echoed this functionalism where public law 
support of the contested standards and the economic significance of complying 
with those standards were considered as arguments to apply EU law rules on the 
free movement of goods to a private standardization and certification activities. 
Accordingly, the defendant SDO was under a legal duty to comply with EU rules of 
mutual recognition of market regulations and non-discrimination of goods 
lawfully traded in other Member States.142   
 
Other considerations of policy and justice may nonetheless militate against 
imposing a duty to exercise reasonable care in standards development in 
negligence. Some US courts have awarded particular weight to the moral blame 
attached to the defendant’s conduct, the potential impact of imposing liability on 
the policy of preventing plaintiff’s harm in the future, and the consequences of 
exposing SDOs to liability on their important societal function of promulgating 
standards in a given domain.143 The absence of any commercial interest of the SDO 
in developing standards may further be relevant.144 Such considerations, next to 
the plaintiff’s failure to show actual reliance on the allegedly inadequate standards 
or that the SDO undertook to perform a duty owed by its members to the plaintiff, 
have also barred the imposition of a duty of care on SDOs in actions based on 
negligent misrepresentation and the voluntary undertaking rule.145 Similar 
considerations would appear to lead courts in England and Wales to refuse to 
expose SDOs to civil liability for standards development under the tort of 
negligence or negligent misstatements. 
B. Factors Bearing on Breach 
The use of foreseeability of harm and the moral blame attached to the SDO’s 
conduct as factors to determine the existence of a duty of care in negligence can 
be criticized for confusing duty with breach.146 Foreseeability, it is contended, first 
                                                        
plaintiff (at 979). In Commerce and Industry Ins. Co. (1999), the court that the incorporation of the allegedly 
inadequate NFPA fire safety standard in government construction regulations did not help to impose a duty 
of care on the NFPA since that incorporation made the relationship between NFPA and the plaintiff’s 
insured too remote to warrant the imposition of a duty. (at 3). 
141 See e.g. Snyder (1996), 1048 and 1050; King (1990), 616; Rountree (2008), 810. 
142 Fra.bo (2012), paras 27-30. 
143 See e.g. Meyers (1987), 404; N.N.V. (1999), 1382-1387. 
144 See e.g. Meyers (1987), 403 (holding that the development of design and construction standards for 
swimming pools ‘is not a money-making operation’). See also Commerce and Industry Ins. Co (1999), 4 (‘The 
NFPA is not even a trade association which acts in the economic self-interest of its members. The 
organization consists of 68,000 individuals and over 80 organizations. It is not a trade group consisting of 
businesses with homogeneous economic interests.’). In Snyder, however, the economic interests involved in 
the development of standards for the blood banking industry was an important consideration to impose a 
duty on AABB. See Snyder (1996), 1050 (‘Although the AABB's mission doubtless has altruistic overtones, 
the bottom line is that the AABB represents its interests and those of its members. At stake for its members 
was a substantial financial interest in the regulation of the industry. (…) Blood is big business.’). Similar 
considerations emerge in relation to civil liability for negligent certification (e.g. Hempstead (1967); 
Hanberry (1969); and Rottinghaus (1983). 
145 See e.g. Commerce and Industry Ins. Co (1999), 3. 
146 See e.g. Heidt 2010, 1256-1258 (criticizing the approach in Snyder) and N.N.V. (1999), 1404 (Amos J., 
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and foremost bears on the issue of breach and determines whether an SDO has 
acted with reasonable care under the circumstances.147 Blameworthiness also 
speaks to the reasonableness of the SDO’s activities in the light of the particular 
circumstances.148 By confusing the duty with breach, courts invade the province 
of the jury, prevent a full legal analysis of the dispute, and effectively shield SDOs 
from being exposed to civil liability. To minimize this strategic behavior of courts 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts proposes, amongst others, that foreseeability is 
a factor to be considered only on the breach issue, not duty, and that moral 
blameworthiness is not a valid consideration of policy.149 
 
Once an SDO is considered to owe a duty of care, it is held to exercise reasonable 
care in the development of its standards. That standard of care implies that it is 
required to avoid harm that was known to it or reasonably foreseeable. American 
common law permits the plaintiff to present at trial a wide range of evidence to 
show that the defendant SDO breached its duty and that the process of standards 
development administered by it fell short of the level of care it was reasonably 
required to exercise. Such evidence generally includes internal company rules or 
rules of association, industry practice, private standards, statutes, government 
regulation and guidance, and cost-benefit analysis.150 Accordingly, a violation of 
the SDO’s own guidelines or bylaws for standards development can be considered 
as evidence showing breach, but also non-compliance with government or 
industry-endorsed principles on how standard-setting procedures should be 
organized in terms of due process or good governance may be used to show that 
the defendant SDO fell short of the level care required.151 
 
Courts in the cases reviewed here do not explicitly refer to these principles of due 
process or good governance in the determination of breach. In fact, there is very 
little consideration around the question of what factors may establish the 
reasonableness of the care that the defendant SDO exercised. In Meneely and 
Snyder – the only two US cases resulting in a damages award against the SDOs 
involved – the issue of breach turned on the narrow question of whether the SDOs 
could have reasonably refused to amend their safety standards while being aware 
of the risk of physical harm these standards posed to others.152 More generally, 
however, these two cases suggest that in establishing breach it is important that 
the SDO uses the knowledge gained from experience with the implementation of 
its standards in practice to inform and direct its decision-making around the 
revision or adoption of new standards.153  
                                                        
147 See extensively Cardi 2005. 
148 Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, §10.4, at 210. 
149 Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 7, cmt. j (2010). See for a 
discussion Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, at 212-213. 
150 See in general Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick 2016, §§12.1-12.10, at 263-289. 
151 Particularly important for this purpose appear to be Circular No. A-119 (2016) (promoting the adoption 
of private standards by US Federal agencies provided they meet attributes of openness, balance of interest, 
due process, having an appeals procedure, and operate on the basis of consensus (at para 4)) and the ANSI 
Essential Requirements (2018) (further detailing the elements set out in Circular No. A-119). 
152 Snyder (1996), 1038 and Meneely (2000), 57. 
153 See also Commerce and Industry Ins. Co (1999), 4 (holding that if the NFPA had owed a duty to plaintiffs, 
it would not have breached the duty because the plaintiffs did not provide evidence that the SDO knew or 
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Such considerations can also be found in the sparse European case law on the 
matter. In the ANFOR case the French court held that the defendant SDO could not 
be at fault in developing standards for concrete pavement because of the limited 
protective scope of the standards and the fact that the SDO swiftly amended these 
standards once inadequacies surfaced.154 Likewise, the German court in Fra.bo 
considered the defendant SDO to have breached its duty under EU law since it 
failed to provide evidence that the adoption of the contentious new standard was 
necessary and proportionate to the protection of health and safety. Moreover, the 
SDO had refused to recognize available testing results from a state-accredited 
laboratory in another Member State.155 Thus, whenever an SDO does not take into 
consideration the state-of-the-art when promulgating or revising its standards, or 
altogether fails to adopt new standards in the face of evidence showing the 
existence of apparent risks to others, it does not act with ordinary care. SDO 
compliance with important good governance attributes such as impact evaluation, 
responsiveness to new insights from practice and technology, and recursive 
learning may thus be rewarded in the assessment of breach. 
 
Some courts in the US have also shown appreciation of the SDO’s efforts to ensure 
inclusive and transparent rulemaking. In Meyers, for example, the court drew 
attention to the practice of public solicitation of comments and suggestions of non-
members on draft standards to ensure a fair representation of interests to argue 
that the element of foreseeability was lacking.156 In N.N.V., the plaintiff alleged that 
AABB’s standard setting procedure was biased towards the interests of private 
organizations concerned with blood products and transfusions and that there was 
no active participation of those representing other interests in the standards 
development. The California Court of Appeal discarded the argument by holding 
that there was no evidence to support the assertions and that the private 
organizations involved did not represent industry alone. Each had different 
classes of membership representing a variety of interests and many voices.157 In 
Snyder, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court sanctioned the absence of 
inclusive and transparent procedures of the AABB, along with the SDO’s 
commitment to promote the financial interests of the blood banking industry at 
the expense of patients’ health and safety.158 Clearly, the courts in these cases 
weigh the facts of the cases in a very different way. However, when read together, 
the judicial considerations involved do reveal that concerns around fair 
stakeholder participation and transparency in procedures for standards 
development, as well as other principles of good governance, can weigh in on the 
determination of whether the SDO reasonably decided on its standards under the 
circumstances.159 
                                                        
standards ‘to keep current with new fire protection knowledge and technologies’ and ‘to include fire safety 
lessons learned from significant fires’.) 
154 See at footnote 108. 
155 See at footnotes 134-135. 
156 Meyers (1987), 403. 
157 N.N.V. (1999), 1393-1394. 
158 Snyder (1996), 1050. 
159 Compare Marasco 2005 (arguing that ANSI-accredited SDOs should not be subject to civil liability when 
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Importantly, the standard of reasonable care does not require a perfect decision 
from the defendant SDO, yet only one that is fair and reasonable at the time of 
consideration. Standards development typically is an ‘imperfect and evolving 
process’.160 While a delay in setting a particular standard in relation to a known 
and foreseeable risk may be negligent, SDOs enjoy a certain level of discretion in 
making choices on what the standard is that it adopts, particularly in times of 
uncertain knowledge about risks.161 Given the nature of decision making in 
standards development, which always involves the balancing of competing 
interests, courts (and juries in the US) should not lightly second-guess the 
decisions of the SDO, but assess whether they, at the time they were made, were 
fair and reasonable to those affected by them. 
 
In the light of the apparent difficulty of conducting such assessment having the 
bias of hindsight, some commentators have suggested that SDOs should be 
protected from such inquiries by awarding them a qualified immunity or 
privilege.162 Such award would mean that SDOs are liable only if they act in bad 
faith. With that, it is suggested, the exposure of SDOs to civil liability does not 
distort the delicate decision-making process around standards development and 
the many laudable goals that SDOs seek thereby to serve. The counter argument 
is that granting (any form of) judicial immunity or privilege is to impute ‘power 
without responsibility’ on private associations that, in their activities, are first and 
foremost concerned with the private interests of those they represent.163 The 
award would furthermore undermine the regulatory potential for tort law to 
encourage SDOs to pursue public policy objectives rather than narrow private 
interests, adopt and review standards based on state-of-the-art scientific 
evidence, and engage in inclusive and transparent procedures of rulemaking.164 
 
6. Conclusion: The Risk of Tort Liability for Standards Development 
 
What then is the risk of incurring tort liability for standards development? Based 
on the review of case law in the US and EU, it must be concluded that this risk is 
relatively low. In the US, the majority of the actions against SDOs have been 
dismissed via motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment with courts 
holding that the SDO involved did not owe a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
the promulgation of its standards to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, many SDOs have 
been shielded from civil liability for harm allegedly caused by their inadequate 
standards. In so holding, a number of courts have strategically played on the 
                                                        
160 Commerce and Industry Ins. Co (1999), 3. 
161 Cf. Jappell (2001), 481 (‘Where delay in setting a particular standard would be negligent, the duty to act 
without negligence may require Defendant to make difficult choices somewhat earlier than it would 
prefer.’). See also Amos, J. dissent in N.N.V. (1999), holding at 1404 that ‘If a duty were imposed on AABB, it 
would not be breached if there was an ongoing debate and the state of knowledge in a particular area was 
still evolving’. 
162 Feldmeier 1999, 796-797 and Heidt 2010, 1079-1084. See also the dissent of Garibaldi J. in Snyder (at 
1056-1057) (arguing that AABB should be granted a qualified immunity based on the quasi-governmental 
nature of its activities in regulating blood banks). 
163 Snyder (1996), 1052-1053. 
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doctrinal complexities in distinguishing between the elements of duty and breach 
in negligence with the view to exclude a defendant’s standard setting activities 
from a jury inquiry. In those no-duty decisions considerations around the absence 
of a specific relationship between the standard-setting activities of the SDO and 
the plaintiff’s harm (i.e. the foreseeability of harm and its closeness of connection 
with the SDO’s conduct) and the consequences of exposing the SDO to liability on 
the important societal function of promulgating standards in a given domain have 
been particularly instrumental in the reasoning of the courts. 
 
The American cases in which a duty of care was imposed have for the most part 
turned on the question of whether the SDO was in a position of authority such that 
its standards were followed by businesses, either out of legal or economic 
imperative. Accordingly, the necessary relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant SDO to sustain a duty could be constructed. All but one of these cases 
concerned wrongful death actions or actions involving severe personal injury.165 
Liability for negligent standard setting causing pure economic loss has not been 
accepted in the US.166 
 
In the EU, there has been very little civil litigation on the development of product 
standards, both within and outside the scope of the New Approach. Judicial control 
over standards development takes place primarily in the context of EU internal 
market law (competition law and free movement law), and judicial review in 
administrative law. However, as the case of Fra.bo shows, the breach of directly 
effective EU rules of internal market law may trigger civil litigation on standards 
development before Member State courts subject to national regimes of tort law. 
Such litigation may enable the recovery of personal injury and property damage, 
but also pure economic loss as was the case in Fra.bo. Accordingly, EU law may 
function as a catalyst for damages actions against SDOs in Europe. 
 
The comparative analysis in this chapter has revealed that there are a number of 
circumstances related to the activities and governance of an SDO that affect its 
exposure to civil liability for standards development. These include: 
 Legal or de facto control to direct compliance with standards. If the SDO 
enjoys a position of authority such that its standards are followed by those 
using them for business operations, i.e. manufacturers and sellers of 
products, it is more likely to be subject to civil liability than if it has no such 
position. Authority or control can exist either de facto or de jure, and may 
be evidenced by showing that the standards are followed out of imperative 
market demands, enjoy a strong degree of government recognition, or are 
                                                        
165 The exception is Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. (1994) (involving extensive property damage 
caused by a hurricane). 
166 See for example Waters v. Autuori (1996) (professional association for accountants owes no duty in 
negligence to the plaintiff who lost money on investments in a failed limited partnership the accounts of 
which had been audited by a member accounting firm based on allegedly inadequate standards developed 
by the association and Appalachian Power Co. v. American Institute of Certified Pub. Accountants (1959) 
(professional association for accountants is not liable for the pure economic loss third parties could 
allegedly sustain as a result of the promulgation of accounting standards, which would adversely affect the 
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coupled with mandatory periodic certification or accreditation 
inspections.  
 Intended purposes of developing standards. If an SDO explicitly and actively 
commits to protect the interests of non-members or industry-outsiders by 
developing standards, the failure to do so in an adequate way will more 
likely lead to civil liability than if the SDO only commits to develop 
standards to promote the (economic) interests of its industry membership.  
 Representations about expertise in standards development. Similarly, public 
statements and promotions by an SDO concerning the importance and 
currency of its standards in economic, government or community practice 
makes the SDO more susceptible to tort liability when the standards it 
promulgates cause harm to others.  
 Commercial benefits. If the SDO stands to gain commercial benefits from the 
development of standards or related certification and accreditation 
inspections, the failure to pursue these activities adequately make it more 
likely to be subject to civil liability if it carries out these activities without 
commercial interests.   
 Good governance. Lastly, the failure of the SDO to observe accepted 
principles of good governance, such as inclusive and transparent 
rulemaking and adoption and review of standards based on state-of-the-
art scientific evidence, makes it more prone to liability. Compliance with 
such principles may show that the SDO exercised reasonable care in 
developing its standards. 
These circumstances underline the very basic idea that an SDO should be 
answerable for harm caused to individuals and firms when it possesses, or holds 
itself out to possess, the power to affect these parties’ interests. With power comes 
responsibility. As the analysis in this chapter has shown, tort law should be 
considered a key legal mechanism through which individuals and firms can hold 
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